

THE INEQUALITY OF SECURITY IN RIO DE JANEIRO

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
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I) Violence & Insecurity in Rio de Janeiro

II) Inequality of Security

III) Conclusion




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I) Violence & Insecurity in Rio de Janeiro

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- Population (RJ state): 17 million
- Homicide rate: 41.5 / 100.000 inhabitants (2007)
- Types of crime
 - Robberies, thefts, physically injuring assaults, threats, homicides, traffic violations (*conventional crime*)
 - Drug trafficking, illegal possession of firearms and extortion (*organised crime*)

I) Violence & Insecurity in Rio de Janeiro

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A 'normal month' in Rio de Janeiro: November 2010

- 365 homicides and 368 attempted homicides
 - 40 dead bodies and 4 human carcasses were found
 - 2 military policemen died, 102 civilians killed by the police
 - 6,606 physically injuring assaults
 - 442 rapes
 - 182 death and 3,291 injuries in traffic accidents
 - 462 disappearances
 - 143 cases of extortions
 - 6,449 people received threats
 - 22,636 robberies and thefts (incl. 2,731 vehicles + 518 mobiles)
 - 796 arms seizures and 1,059 drugs seizures
- → In total: **54,447 occurrences**

I) Violence & Insecurity in Rio de Janeiro

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Causes of Crime, Violence & Insecurity

- ❑ **Drug trafficking**
- ❑ **Territorialisation of favelas**
- ❑ **Availability of firearms**
- ❑ **Police misconduct: police violence, corruption, impunity**
- ❑ **Urbanisation, poverty, inequality**


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
II) The Inequality of Security

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Definition:

The **Inequality of Security** is the demographic, geographic, political, economic and social inequality in the access to and provision of security as a **societal good** and a **human right*** which manifests itself in terms of one's age, gender, place of domicile, security provider, income and race.

II) The Inequality of Security



Security Provision in Rio de Janeiro

Public Security Provision

Federal Police & Força Nacional de
Segurança Pública (FNSP)
(Federal jurisdiction)

RJ Military Police and Fire Brigade
(State jurisdiction)

RJ Civil Police
(State jurisdiction)

RJ Municipal Police
(Municipal Jurisdiction)

Armed Forces
(Federal jurisdiction)

Private Security Provision

Registered Security Companies

Clandestine Security Companies

Drug Trafficking Factions

Death Squads

Militias

**SECURITY
PROVIDER**

II) The Inequality of Security

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Research objectives:

- ❑ Elaboration of a **policy tool** to improve public security performance in Latin America
- ❑ Analysis of the shortcomings of public security in RJ from the perspective of the citizens as **recipients** of security (opposed to the state as the **provider** of security)
- ❑ Identifying of **'target groups'** for future public security policies
- ❑ Identifying of **policy solutions**

Methodology

- 1) What does security mean in the context of Rio de Janeiro? Which inequalities exist? (3 months) → **Semi-structured, qualitative interviews** with different stakeholders
- 2) Measurement of the individual's perception of security (6 months) → **Quantitative survey** in the form of a questionnaire
- 3) How can these inequalities be explained (2 months)? → **Focus groups** with experts in the field of crime, violence and public security


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III) Conclusion

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- **Inequality of Security:**
 - ❖ Security is a societal good and a human right that is unequally distributed by the state authorities of RJ.

- **Consequences:**
 - ❖ Brazil is not living up to its commitments in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Right to Security).
 - ❖ Brazil is also not living up to the ideals of a democratic state and non-discriminatory, inclusive citizenship.

- **Traditional explanation would be...**
 - ❖ Democracy is still **incomplete** or **underway**.
 - ❖ Crime and violence (and the Inequality of Security) are due to an **absent, failed** or **limited state**.

III) Conclusion

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Yet my argument is...

- ❖ The argument of the ‚absent state‘ is **too simplistic** to conceptualise crime, violence and insecurity in Rio de Janeiro.
- ❖ Crime, violence and insecurity are **intrinsic** to the state, especially the public security apparatus.
- ❖ Crime, violence and insecurity prosper in Rio de Janeiro not because of the **absence of the state** but rather because of the **way in which the state is present**.

→ **To decrease the Inequality of Security would be one tiny step to bring RJ state closer to the ideals of inclusive democracy and citizenship.**

Muito obrigada!

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Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE)

- Elite special force unit of the military police Rio
- 394 men, trained in urban warfare
- Activities are 100% repressive
- → shootouts and violent encounters between the police and the traffickers become a daily occurrence
- Critique: BOPE's practices have been criticised as uncivil, wrongful, inhumane, non-democratic and – at times – unconstitutional.




Unidades de Policia Pacificadora (UPPs)

- Military police units based on the principles of community policing
- The UPPs came into effect in 2008 under Rio's state governor *Sérgio Cabral*
- Objective: recapture and pacify territories that have been occupied by traffickers or militias
- Goal: Until the end of 2010, the UPPs shall consist of 3,500 policemen with the goal to raise this number to 60,000 until the Olympic Games in 2016



Four phases of pacification:



Phase	1	2	3	4
Pacification Process	Retaking	Stabilisation	Definitive Occupation	Post-Occupation
Actors	BOPE	BOPE	UPPs	UPPs, Instituto de Segurança Pública (ISP)
Characteristics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Guerra avisada</i> [announced war] • Use of tactic forces • Focus on intelligence actions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintenance of control • Elimination of ultimate cells of resistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preventive focus • Police of approximation • Recently trained and specialised personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deepening in the relationship with the community • Accompanying studies of the quality of the services provided • Develop objective and subjective benchmarks
Repression Level	Very high	High	Low	Nil
Prevention Level	Nil	Low	High	Very high

UPPs: Critique

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Successes:

- ❖ **Favelas become accessible**
 - Personal security improved
 - The access to state and private services in their favelas had improved
 - UPP Social coordinates the social services in the UPP communities (*second wave of pacification*)
- ❖ **Approximation between police and favela residents**
- ❖ **Decrease of drug trafficking, executions and shootouts**

Concerns:

- ❖ **What is new about the UPPs?**
 - In the past three decades, there were several small-scale community policing attempts in Rio, such as *Mutirão pela Paz* and *Grupo de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais* (GPAE)
 - The media 'adopted' (Storani: 2010) the UPPs, uncritical coverage
- ❖ **Migration of crime**
 - Most important obstacle to success
 - Are the UPPs purely changing indicators?
 - 3 favelas are receiving traffickers: Complexo do Maré, Complexo do Jacarezinho and, most importantly, the Complexo do Alemão (Monteiro: 2010).
- ❖ **Sustainability**