The Empty Shell of Shared Responsibility in Drug Control:
A Case Study of Afghanistan and Colombia

Dr. Jorrit Kamminga (Universidad de Valencia)
LINKSCH CONFERENCE
Grasping the Links in the Chain: Understanding the Unintended Consequence of International Counter-Narcotics Measures for the EU
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Index
1. Why study Shared Responsibility?
2. The case of Colombia
3. Some comparisons with Afghanistan
4. Modest conclusions/recommendations
Research

International regime theory


Securitisation theory (Copenhagen School)


- Creation of an International Economic Security Regime (RISE) that could help to strengthen and deepen international cooperation on Alternative Development (AD)
RISE

Cooperation on Alternative Development

International Cooperation

State Building and Security

Human Development and Human Rights

Market Access

Shared Responsibility

Economic Security
1. Why study Shared Responsibility?

- Commission on Narcotics Drugs (CND)
A short history of Shared Responsibility (I)

- **1984**: UN General Assembly underlines collective responsibility of states on issue of drugs.
- **1990**: 17th UNGASS adopts political declaration based on principle of shared responsibility.
- **1998**: 20th UNGASS of 1998 firmly establishes “Balanced Approach” and “common and shared responsibility”.
- **2009**: Political Declaration and Action Plan.
- **CND sessions of 2011 and 2012**.
1. Why study Shared Responsibility?

- Commission on Narcotics Drugs (CND)
- **Key question:** Does it go beyond political rhetoric?
- **Key challenge:** How to measure it?
  
  A. International support
  B. International market access

- Delimitations of my case study:
  
  - Alternative Development (AD)
  - Colombia (1998 – 2012)
  - Regions of Tumaco, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Meta
2. The case of Colombia
2. The case of Colombia

- Since 1998 support mainly from US and EU.
- EU: Focus especially on development, peace building, civil society and strengthening of local institutions?
- US: Focus especially on drugs and conflict?
- Some (other) bilateral support (mainly Belgium, Canada, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and UK.)
A short history of International cooperation (I)

- **United States:**
  - From Andean Strategy to Plan Colombia.
  - Concrete support through USAID.
    - Range of local programmes/operators: ADAM, MIDAS, ACDI-VOCA, Chemonics, FUPAD.
  - Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA).
  - Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA).
European Union:
- From Specialized Dialogue on Drugs with the four countries of CAN (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) to EU-Latin America and Caribbean Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs to COPOLAD.
- Concrete support through EU Peace Laboratories.
- EU: Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and GSP Plus.
General outcomes

La Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta

- **International Support:** Mostly limited to USAID, with some additional bilateral support (e.g. Italy). Other international support is mainly provided through multilateral channels such as the IADB (e.g. Japan).
- **Products/projects supported internationally:** Especially coffee and cocoa (agro-forestry), fishing, some honey production and eco-tourism, and timber through sustainable (reforestation) projects.
- **International market access:** organic coffee and indirectly for cocoa.
- **Shared Responsibility:** In terms of bilateral cooperation mainly limited to the United States through USAID. Other countries such as Italy have also supported AD in the region.
General outcomes

The Department of Meta:

- **International Support:** In the bilateral sense mainly limited to the United States (USAID) and the Netherlands. Multilaterally the EU.

- **Products/projects supported internationally:** Mainly livestock, milk, cocoa, coffee, sugar cane and plantain. Rubber is increasingly being promoted but so far production is limited.

- **International market access:** Very limited on none. In the future perhaps rubber.

- **Shared Responsibility:** Only the United States and the Netherlands in terms of direct and indirect linkages between their support programmes and the objective of drug control. Through the EU, other countries contribute to the EU Peace Laboratory.
General outcomes

The region of Tumaco:

- **International Support:** Mostly limited to USAID, with some additional support of UNDP and the EU.
- **Products/projects supported internationally:** Especially cocoa, coconut, oil palm and timber. To a lesser extent artisanal fishing, sugar cane, rice, plantain, forestry plantations, some other crops, and silvopasture (combining forestry with animal husbandry). Also: protection of biodiversity and natural resources.
- **International market access:** Almost inexistent, except for *piangua*, palm oil (before the fungus disease) and indirectly for some cocoa through bulk processing in factories outside of the region.
- **Shared Responsibility:** In terms of bilateral cooperation mainly limited to the United States through USAID.
3. Afghanistan and Colombia (I)
The strategic focus of the PNCRT

Fundamental Rights
(Art. 2 Political Constitution of Colombia 1991)

Institutionalisation of the territory
- Rule of Law
- Public services
- Institutional legitimacy

Citizen participation and good governance
- Community organization
- Participation
- Capacity of local governments

Regional integration
- Infrastructure and connectivity
- Economic development
- Property rights
- Social development

Territorial Security

Objective

Pillars

Transition
(Capacity Building)
3. Afghanistan and Colombia (II)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What Afghanistan and Colombia have in common in terms of AD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long history</strong> of AD interventions or similar rural development efforts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scattered, disconnected efforts of AD</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Compartmented</strong> International support linked to regions (more in Afghanistan due to ISAF mission)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Especially <strong>agricultural</strong> produce, low added value, hardly any agro-industry</td>
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<td>Mostly for <strong>local markets</strong>, sometimes national, hardly ever international</td>
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<td>Mostly <strong>small-scale</strong>: a few hundred farmers at a time</td>
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<td>Classic <strong>marketing problems</strong> (low quality, low volume, poor frequency)</td>
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<td><strong>High transportation costs</strong> related to remoteness of areas</td>
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<td>Focus on ´success stories´, <strong>wonder crops</strong> or poster crops</td>
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<td><strong>Shifts</strong> in approaches and priorities (especially Colombia)</td>
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<td><strong>AD opportunities</strong> limited in areas because of security situation or presence of AOG</td>
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<td><strong>Very little evidence</strong> of long-term impact or causality with levels of illicit cultivation</td>
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3. Afghanistan and Colombia (III)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>What is different in Afghanistan</th>
<th>What is different in Colombia</th>
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<tr>
<td>CN efforts falling off the map</td>
<td>CN efforts high on the agenda</td>
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<td><strong>International cooperation/support</strong> decreasing but still substantial (least developed country)</td>
<td><strong>International cooperation/support</strong> decreasing as an upper-middle income country</td>
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<td>Fewer alternative crops and supporting infrastructure available</td>
<td>More alternative crops and supporting infrastructure available</td>
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<td>No access to sea ports</td>
<td>Access to sea ports</td>
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<tr>
<td>No tourism industry</td>
<td><strong>Tourism</strong> industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stick of crop eradication is weaker</td>
<td>Stick of crop eradication is stronger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of religion, traditional leaders/shuras more important in farmer’s decision-making</td>
<td>Not key factors</td>
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<td>CN dependent on international assistance</td>
<td>More able to pay for CN efforts</td>
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Modest conclusions

1. Without the US there would be hardly any bilateral form of shared responsibility in Colombia.

2. Multilaterally (e.g. the EU), the link with drugs becomes very weak.

3. Much of the international (development) cooperation is not linked to drugs at all.

4. Access to international markets does not really include AD products.

5. **No real securitisisation but politicisation**

6. There are no 53 countries assisting AD in Colombia
Modest recommendations

How to boost support through shared responsibility?

- Drugs/AD discourse does not sell
- How to solve that?

1. Increase linkages with climate change
   a. Protection of the tropical forest as a source of oxygen/carbon absorption
   b. Protection of the mountain ecosystems as a source of water

2. Focus on linkages with companies, not countries
Thanks!

jorritka@gmail.com
jksamminga@clingendael.nl